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Der Bericht, der im Rahmen eines Forschungsauftrages mit der International
Atomic Energy Agency Wien angefertigt wurde, enthält einen Vorschlag zur
Kontrolle des Spaltstoffflusses in einer Anlage wie der Wiederaufarbeitungs-
anlage Karlsruhe (WAK).
Nach einer Analyse der WAK wurden zunächst 4ie für ein rationales Kontroll-
system wichtigen Bereiche, die strategischen Bereiche, abgegrenzt.
Es wurden die Maßnahmen angegeben, mittels d.er die Spaltmaterialkontrolle
ohne Beeinträchtigung des Betriebsablaufs von den strategischen Bereichen
aus durchgeführt werden kann. Detaillierte Anweisungen wurden der Inspektions-
tätigkeit zugrunde gelegt.
Die Materialbilanz als eine der wesentlichen Maßnahmen wurde hinsichtlich
ihres möglichen Unsicherheitsbereichs aufgrund von Meßfehlern sowie möglicher
Fehlbeträge untersucht.
Nach einer Abschätzung der mit dem vorgeschlagenen System verbundenen Kontroll-
kosten schließt der Bericht mit einem Ausblick auf Verbesserungen im Hinblick
The report made within the framework of a contract between the International
Atomic Energy Agency Vienna and the Gesellschaft für Kernforschung Karlsruhe
contains a proposal for safeguarding the flow of the fissile material in a
reprocessing plant similar to the Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe (WAK).
After an analysis of the WAK at first the areas relevant to a rational safe-
guards system, the strategie areas, have been defined.
The measures at these strategie areas have been developed by which the fissile
material can be safeguarded in a non-intrusive manner and without hampering
the normal plant operation.•
The activities of the inspectors are based on detailed procedures.
The material balance as one of the most important measures has been investigated
in view of the possible uncertainty range on account of measurement errors
and in view of possible deficits.
After an estimation of the costs of the proposed system in the final report
several possible improvements concerning methods, instruments, techniques,







3.1 Objeetive of the safeguards system
3.2 Charaeteristies of a reproeessing plant
4. Deseription of the WAK plant
4.1 Reproeessing program
4.2 Deseription of the plant
4.3 Deseription of the separation proeess
5. Identifieation of strategie points
5.1 Strategie point 1
5.2 Stratlegie point 2
5.3 Strategie point 3
6'. Safeguard measures at the strategie areas
7. Safeguardsproeedures
8. Estimation of safeguards efforts
9. Statistieal eonsideration in establishing material balance
10. Analysis of the problem of MUF
11. possibilities of improvement
11.1 Teehniques. methods. instruments
11. 2 Layout of plants
-4-
1. Summary
The present report deseribes the work and the results obtained in eonneetion
with the IAEA eontraet No. 712/RB on the'Development of Safeguards Proee-
dures for a Reproeessing Plant Similar to the WAK Type'. This work has been
earried out at the Institut für Angewandte Reaktorphysik, Kernforschungszentrum
Karlsruhe.
After a detailed analysis of the WAK plant layout arid process steps as well
as demareation of the plant oper.ation and areast which are relevant to a
rational safeguards system, the strategie areas in the plant have been defined.
At these areas all the information required for safeguards purposes ean be ob-
tained in a non-intrusive manner and without hampering the normal operation of
the plant.
The detailed safeguards measures at these strategi~ areas have been developed
and the procedures for earrying out these measures have been been laid out.
The error propagation mechanism, after taking into eonsideration both the
random and the systematie components of measurement error, has been analyaed
and its influence on the establishment of a material balance has been shown
with the help of a numerical example.
An effort has also been made to estimate the costs to be expected for the safe-
guards system proposed in this report. It is shown that they may be about
3 %of the reprocessing eosts from the plant. Chemical analyses form a major
part of the total eosts. Means of reducing these eosts have been discussed.
In the final part of the report, a number of possible improvements with
regard to safeguards methods instruments and teehniques have been discussed.
Some estimates on the development time and efforts have also been made. Besides,
some relevant features in a reprocessing pl~~t, which may be of interest for
safeguards, have been described with the help of a reference plant layout.
ilanuskript e i ngere Lcht; 21.4.70
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2. Introduction
The rapid expansion of nuclear industries for the production of nuclear power
as evidenced during the past few years in a large number of countries, indicate
that the production of plutonium will increase at an extremely rapid rate during
the coming years. For example, on the basis of recent nuclear power forecasts
/-1, 2_7, the total accumulated plutonium in irradiated fuel elements in 1980,
is expected to be around 20 t in Germany, 60 t in Europe and 85 t in the USA.
Most of these fuel elements will be processed in reprocessing plants so that,
large amounts of plutonium are expected to be present in such plants in fairly
accessible form. Therefore it is desirable to investigate and develop rational
methods for safeguarding the flow of such fissile materials in these plants.
3. Basic Considerations
3.1 Objective of the safeguards system
The objective of a fissile
is to prevent or to detect
material from the plant.
material safeguards system for a reprocessing plant
a diversion of a significant amount of fissile
It has been shown in a number of publications / 3-10_7 that this objective can
be attained with three basic safeguards measures namely, containment, material
balance (comprising of throughput and inventory measures) and other redundant
measures (surveillance, television, mechanical registration of movements and
activities etc.). A balanced combination of these three measures are required
to develop an effective safeguards system. However, the material balance plays
a key-role in any safeguards system, as it can detect in a quantitative manner
a diversion of fissile material, although with a time lag depending on the
method of carrying out the inventory.
Integral safeguards exercises executed in existing nuclear facilities '-7,8,9_7
and a number of computer simulations of fissionable material flow in such
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faeilities I 4, 11_7, have shown definitely that all safeguards measures
required to fulfill the objeetive of an effective safeguards system, ean be
earried out in strategie areas under normal eonditions.
Definition of strategie areas: The first objeetive therefore, of this report
is to identify and demareate the strategie areas. In this eontext, the strategie
areas have been defined as those areas in a nuelear facility, in whieh all the
relevant information required to execute safeguards measures, are made available
to inspeetion authority. These areas are so chosen, that the safeguards aetivities
ean be carried out non-intrusively and without in anyway hampering the normal
operation of the plant.
Before identifying the strategie areas some knowledge on the layout as weIl as
on the operation eharaeteristies of the plant is required.
3.2 Charaeteristies of a reprocessing plant
A reproeessing plant of the WAK type ean be divided into three important plant
seetions aecording to the flow of fissile material through it:
a) the fuel element storage
b) the ehemieal process and
e) the produet and waste storage.
These sections appear to be weIl suited for analysing a WAK type plant from the
point of view of safeguards. In a) and e) no proeessing of material takes place,
and the fissile material is contained in weIl defined forms of fuel subassemblies
or fissile material containers. Therefore containment measures eonsisting of
identification of seals or sealing of containers appear to be weIl suited and
suffieient safeguards measures for these areas in ensuring that the fissile
material reaches the endpoint of the plant seetion in question. Because of the
definition in 3.1, these two sections, namely the fuelelement storage and
product and waste storage areas can be considered at strategie areas.
For the chemieal process area the definition of a strategie area can he
fulfilled in an ideal manner, if all the information required to establish an
independent material balance can be brought together outside the ehemical
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process area to a room. Such a room could be called an inspection room.
This situation is shown in Fig. 3-1.
Two important points in connection with the inspection room should be noted
additionally. Firstly, because of the discontinuity of data of material flow
between the outgoing material of the fuel element storage area (in the form of
fuel elements),and the incoming material of the chemical process area (in the
form of solution in the dissolver tank), special containment measures are re-
quired at the transfer point. Secondly, because of the separation of the sensing
and the recording part of instruments required to obtain data from the chemical
process area to the inspection room, some additional electrical lines and con-
duits are required. Special measures have to be taken to ensure the tamperproof-
ness of these lines and conduits.
4. DescriPtion of the w~x plant
4.1 Reprocessing program
The WAK reprocessing plant is designed for a nominal capacity of 200 kg U02/d
or 40 t u02iyr.
According to the present layout, the plant is capable of processing spent fuels
enriched up to 3 % U-235 with an average burnup not higher than 20 000 }~d/t
heavy metal. A minimum cooling time of 150 d is specified.
The final product of the reprocessing at the WAK plant consists of uranium
nitrate solution of about 450 g U/l and plutonium nitrate solution of about
30-50 g Pu/I.
4.2 Description of the plant
The largest and most important part of the WAK plant is the process building.
The layout of the building is shown in Figs. 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3. The major opera-









The core of the plant is represented by a row of 14 concrete cells (1/01 to
IX/OIX) in which the active apparatus and components are insta1led.
At the east side of the cel1s
the energy and medium supply (063 Fig. 4-1)
a drainage tank storage (067 Fig. 4-1)
and in the f100rs over this
the analytica1 laboratory
and the sampling ga11ery
are located.
The west side houses
the ventilation equipment
the reagents make up
va1ve gallery
central panel
(165 to 188. Fig. 4-2)
(259 Fig. 4-3)




A crane hall forms the superstructure on top of the cell block (257 FigG 4-3).
An appendix at the north side of the process bui1ding provides for final
product storage (095 to 097 Fig. 4-1).
Aseparate bui1ding at the west side of the process bui1ding houses the
waste storage tanks and the corresponding measuring equipment.
4.3 Description of the separation process
The aqueous process of solvent extraction by tributylphosphate (Purex process)
is used at the WAK plant. The different process steps are shown in Figs. 4-4
and 4-5.
The head-end step consists of a chop-1each process for single pins after dis-
assembling the subassemb1ies.
Mixer sett1ers are used for the chemica1 separation of uranium and plutonium
from the fission products.
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The process comprises of several consecutive extraction cycles. In the
first cycle. uranium and plutonium are decontaminated and separated by re-
duction. A second extraction cycle is used for further decontamination for
both uranium and plutonium. For final purification. silicagel is used for
uranium and ion exchange for plutonium.
4.3.1 Reception and storage of fuel elements
The shielded casks arriving at the process building are lifted by a 75 ton
bridge crane into the cleaning room. After cleaning. the fuel elements are
unloaded in the west part of the storage pool and transported by a 1 ton
bridge crane to the foreseen storage position.
4.3.2 Headend
For the mechanical treatment and dissolution. the fuel elements are transferred
to the head-end cell I through an underwater channel.
At first the fuel elements are disassembled. Then the single pins are chopped
in sections of about 5 cm length dropping in a basket of the dissolver. After
selective dissolution of fuel by nitric acid the leached hulls are removed
and filled in barrels which are locked out of cell I. A measurement of fissile
material content is foreseen in cell 11. The barrels are lifted then in a
shielded cask and temporarily stored in cellOlI. Dissolver solution is measured
and adjusted in cell 01.
The following steps inside the process area are unimportant from the point of












The nitric acid from the extraction cycles and the plutonium end purification.
still containing traces of uranium and plutonium is fed back to the head-end
after evaporation. There the recycled acid together with fresh acid is used
for dissolution of the spent fuel.
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4.3.9 Final product
The U-p.roduct is bottled or filled ;n. cont~;nD~s . 09~/oo7 ~ ~..... .. -- -. l.n rooms JI J Ol. tue
appendix. After measurement it can be temporarily stored there before
shipping.
The Pu-produet is bottled in eell VIII and measured. It is stored in room
096 of the appendix before shipping.
4.3.10 Waste
After measurement, batehes of liquid waste are transferred to the waste storage
building through a shielded line.
High aetive waste is permanently stored in a 75 m3 tank.
Liquid waste of lower aetivity is temporarily stored in smaller tanks and is
transported by trucks equipped with shielded tanks for further concentration
and storage.
5. Identification of Strategie Points
On the basis of the eonsiderations in Seetion 3 and the description of the
plant layout and operations in Seetion 4, the strategie areas for the purposes
of safeguards ean be identified. The loeation and funetion of all
the strategie areas are summarized in Tab. 5-1.
5.1 Strategie point 1
The fuel element storage hall can be defined as the strategie area 1 (SP 1).
Fig. 4-2 shows this area as room 164 of the WAK plant.
5.2 Strategie p0int 2
Strategie point ~ is represented mainly by the ins~eetion room SP2a.
The signifieant feature of such a room, located in an outer part of the plant,
is the possibility to get there the bulk of in~ormations required for safe-
guarding fissile material.
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Beeause of the special situation at the WAK plant, the inspeetion room SP2a
is supplemented by a plaee belonging to the analytieal laboratory SP2b,
where all the sampies arrive automatieally from the plant and the inspeetion
samples ean be reeeived.
The possible loeation of SP2a in the WAK plant is shown in Fig. 4-3 and that
of SP2b in Fig. 4-2. It i8 ~n be noted, that the SP2a does not exist at present.
5.3 Strategie point 3
Strategie point 3 eonsists of the areas, in whieh the final produet lS
bottled and stored and shipped and in whieh the waste is stored and shipped.
Figs. 4-1 and 4-2 show the areas of strategie point 3 at the WAK plant.
6. Safeguards measures at the strategie areas
The safeguards measures and aetivities foreseen for the 3 strategie areas and
their purposes are summarized in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3.
Several cörrll~ents on thestructure b~safeguards measlires are given in the
following.
6.1 Strategie point 1
The spent fuel eoming from a reaetor arrives at the fuel element storage hall
in a shielded eask. The subassemblies (SA) are unloaded and stored there until
proeesslng.
Beeause the fissile material is eontained in SAls the maln safeguar.ds measures
to be undertaken by inspection are eounting and identification against sub-
stitution. (Ms. 1-2, 1-4, 1-5)
Improved possibilities for carrying out these measures are glven 1n section
11.1.1 and 11.1.2.
Besides this after arrival the seal of the shielding cask has to be inspected
against opening and substitution of the eask. In the same way inspection of the
cask to be intact as containment lS neeessary. The data of the shielding cask
particularly the fingerprintof the seal have to be compared with the corres-
ponding data obtained fromthe shippers inspection. After unloading the cask has
to be resealed. (Ms. 1-1, 1-3)
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A sealing system, whieh seems to be usable within relatively short time
also is given in seetion 11.1.4.
6.2 Strategie point 2
The major bulk of safeguards measures particularly with respeet tö the
material balance to be established over the chemical process, where separation
of fission products from U and Pu and purifieation of U and Pu takes place,
are to be exeeuted in the inspection room (SP2a). The inspection room was assumed
to be constructed near the transmitter gallery. Therefore, the operatorIs
measuring system eould be used to a far extent without requiring long connection
lines.
As mentioned earlier, the inspection room (SP2a) is supplemented by a place in
the analytical laboratory (SP2b) so major additional installations for receiv-
1ng inspector s&üples could be avoided. It is optional for the inspeetion
authority to send the samples to some other laboratories for analysis or get
the analyses at the operational laboratories if enough capacity and faeilities
are ava'iLabLe,
Ccmments onthe safegua~ds measures tö be lliidertaken at SP2 are ~iven-below.
6.2.1 Information about arrival of a shielding cask
No special measure is required to inform the inspeetor about arrival of
a shielding eask. At all events this has to be done by the plant operator.
Only the inspeetor is allowed to remove the eask seal after inspection
(M,. 1-1).
6.2.2 Head end cell
Because of the discontinuity of the material data between the SA's transfered
from the storage pool to the head end cell and the input measurement containment
measures are required for the head end cello
All the transfers between storage pool and head-end cell are indicated at SP2a
by a distance-cum-load instrument installed at the underwater channel crane
(M.2-l) supported by a radiation level instrument installed at the underwater
channel. Further radiation level instruments are installed at different surfaces
of the head-end cell to indicate at SP2a any uncontrolled removal of fissile
material through openings from the head-end cell (M. 2-2).
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Details about distance curo load and radiation level instruments, which seem
to be applicable within a relatively short time are given in section 11.1.3.
A second possible way for uncontrolled removal of fissile material could be
the p1pe lines connected with the dissolver, which penetrate the containment.
The flow or the flow direction inside these lines is therefore indicated at
SP2a by liquid indication instruments installed at the lines near the dissolver
(M. 2-3).
The liquid indication instrument isntallation can only be effective, if no
changes occur. For this purpose a TV camera is installed near the dissolver.
The corresponding receiver at SP2a shows any unusual events (M. 2-4). A TV
camera in the dissolver cavity does not appear to be intrusive.
The usual products leaving the head-end cell are firstly the solid wastes
particularly the leached hulls and secondly, the dissolver solution. When solid
waste is locked out from the head-end cel1, a neutron generator is automatical1y
switched on. The recording part of this instrument installed at SP2a indicates
the fissile material content of the solid waste (H. 2-5').
The dissolver solution is accounted by the input measurement.
6.2.3 Input measurement
The required measuring instruments are installed at SP2a (M. 2-6). Atthis point
measures have to be undertaken to ensure that the possibility of indicating a
reduced amount than what actually is the case, should be reduced. Such a con-
,,' + •........ 1...,1.0n could be simulated by the plant operator by either
a) an intended incorrect operation or
b) ch~~ges cf the system.
6.2.3.1 Input tank and adjoined lines
A possibility according to a) could be that during filling of the tank solu-
tion is jetted off. Because level indication increases if jett off rate is
smaller than filling rate, this fact can not be identified using only the
level recorder. Monitoring of the steamjet valves is not sufficient because
this installation can be changed according to b). Therefore, allIines
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connected with the tank except diptubes are to oe equipped with liquid indication
instruments and corresponding recorders installed at SP2a (M. 2-9). None of
the pipe lines excepting the sarnpling lines have to be inspected with regard
to their destination.
Although difficult because of the high radiation level, a possibility accord-
ing to b) could be to remove liquid indication instruments or to install new
pipe connections with the tank and to jett off dissolver solution as described
above. As countermeasure TV observation of the tank and adjoined lines seems
to be adequate (M. 2-10).
A special possibility in this context would be filling up the input tank with
more dissolver solution in such a way that some of it goes to the process area
through the overflow. This case is detected also by M. 2-9 but the actual amount
~s not determined. It would be of mutual interest if this case could be excluded
by installation of an automatic device switsching off the feeding steamjet at
apreset level.
6.2.3.2 Sampling system
A very simple way according to a) would be taking a sample for inspection
from a tank containing solution of lower fissile material concentration. In-
spector monitored sarnpling as countermeasure would be cumbersome and probably
not sufficient because of the multiplicity of possibilities according to b)
e.g. substitution of filled vials etc.
Countermeasures of the fo110wing type appear to be reasonable:
As a1ready mentioned, both the ends of the samp1ing 1ine near the input tank are
equipped with liquid indication instrQments. Therefore. inspection is informed
about the (correct or uncorrect) time and number of input sampling procedures
(Part of M. 2-9).
In the same way the sample line of the input tank (and fivg other tanks) at
the sampler in the samp1ing gal1ery are equipped with liquid indication
instruments (M. 2-11).
By comparison of the respective recorQs, an inspector can ensure that during
input sampling no other ne edle block of the sampler was in function. Besides
this, the installation of liquid indication instruments at three different,
points along the sampling line ensures sufficient information about the regula-
rity of the samp1ing procedure.
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Since empty vials for the sampler are marked by inspection and under TV ob-
servation (M. 2-12)s are inserted into the sampler magazines with a known se-
quence s the inspector can identify the time a sample was taken.
The time interval from a sampling procedure until arrival of the sample at
the box in the analytical laboratory can be considered as constant because
of the highly automatized system. The time of arrival of an inspector sample
in the box is recorded.
To avoid substitution of the contents of a vial inside the box in the analy-
tical laboratorys inspector samples have to be put into a casing s from
which samples can be locked out only by the inspector (r1. 2-14).
6.2.3.3 Dip tube system
Possibilities for falsification according to a) could be the incorrect position
of valves and rotameters at the transmitter gallery. If no special monitoring
equipment is provided s inspector has to verif.y the position at the time of
measurement (M. 2-18).
There are many possibilities according to b). One example would be controlled
venting of air from one diptube. Because monitoring equipment does not seem
to be realizable in a reasonable manner, dip tube installation has to be in-
spected (M. 2-18).
6.2.4 Measurement of recycled acid (RA)
Because of the interconnections of the RA measurements with the input measure-
ments they require particular attention and may be treated in the following
manner:
The major part of RA which are in tanks No. 48.05 and 48.10 (Fig. 6-1) contains
only traces of fissile material (AFA s Tab. 9-1). It can be measured in these
tanks and no special precaution needs be taken.
The smaller part of RA which may have a higher fissile material concentration
(2 Ws Tab. 9-1)s (after measurement in tank No. 46.10 (Fig. 6-1)) is measured
in the dissolver once more before a dissolution process is started.
The containment measures for this are basically the same as those fore seen
for the input tank (Ms. 2-7 s 2-11, 2-12, 2-15, 2-18.).
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6.2.5 Waste measurement and physical inventory
Besides input and recycled acid the flow of wastes leaving the r·ffiA chemical
process during a campaign can also be followed up at SP2a (Ms. 2-8 and 2-16)
using the waste catch tanks (Fig. 6-1).
By having information at SP2 from waste catch tanks mentioned above t the follow-
ing advantages are obtained:
a) An inspector can get information about possible irregularities ln
the course of a reprocessing campaign with a minimum time lag. Re-
levant information for starting the process inventory determination t
which is a method under development t can be obtained. The accuracy
of informations is much better as the tanks concerned are smaller
than those installed at SP3.
b) Physical inventory after a campaign can be carried out (Ms. 2-13 and
2-17) •
6.3 Strategie point 3
Within the area of SP3 the final product is bottled and stored. Also liquid
and solid wastes are stored there.
6.3.1 Final product
Special safeguards efforts are required for the final product as it is
available in a weIl accessible form.
Therefore t all product measurements are to be carried out in the presence
Bottles or containers stored afterwards t are safeguarded by means of counting t
sealing and identification. Inspectors at the receiver site are to be informed
about the bottles and containers shipped (Ms. 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6 t 3-7, 3-8).
Improved possibilities for carrying out these measures particularly in case
of Pu product and U product with a U enrichment > 1.6 %are given in section
11.1.1 and ll.1.e.
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A sealing system, which seems to be usable within relatively short time lS
given in section 11.1. 4•
6.3.2 Permanently stored liquid waste
The data of measurement of permanently stored liquid waste (M. 3-9) are used
in establishing the material balance after a campaign. This measurement can
be taken as a countercheck of the corresponding information obtained at SP2
(Ms. 2-8, 2-16).
The installation has to be inspected (M. 3-10) at the time of taking the
measurement.
6.3.3 Temporarily stored liquid waste
Measurements of temporarily stored liquid waste (Ms. 3-11, 3-14) also serve
both for the establishment of a material balance after a campaign and as
countercheck of the informations obtained at SP2 (Ms.2-8, 2-16).
The installations are inspected simultaneously (M. 3-12) at the time of taking
the measurements.
The cistern trucks used for shipping the waste have to be counted, sealed and
inspected. (M. 3-13)
6.3.4 Solid waste
Solid waste barrels after measurement of fissile material content (M. 2-5) are
introduced into shielded containers. These containers are safeguarded by count-
ing and sealing.(Ms. 3-15, 3-16, 3-17)
A sealing system, which seems to be usable within relatively short time is
given in section 11.1.4.
7. Safeguards procedures
The detailed procedures required to execute the safeguards measures listed 1n
Tab. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3 are presented in this chapter.
The procedures include schematic forms in which the relevant data can be entered.
These forms given on pages 46 to 49 are largely designed in such a ~ner
as to facilitate automatie data proeessing.
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Procedure 1-1-------------
Inspector will be informed about arrival of a shielding cask containing spent
fuel subassemblies (SA) by the plant operator. In a .well accessible position
of the cask fixed at the hook of the 75 ton crane, inspector has to verify
that the cask as containment and the cask seal are intact. Cask seal has to
be removed. Identification marks found out of the cask seal have to be compared
with corresponding data obtained from the shippers inspection,to ensure that
cask could not be substituted. In case cask or cask seal are not intact or
identification marks do npt agree,further investigation has to be started.
Data of the eask and cask seal have to be noted down in form No. 1.
Procedure 1-2-------------
If the lid of the shielding cask is removed SA's are lifted up subsequently
by the 1 ton crane. Identification marks (digits, letters etc.) of the SA's
suitably positioned under water have to be read by the inspector using opera-
tor's telescope. The water surface at the same time is tranquilized by a glass
pane. Additionally the state of eachSA as containment has to be inspected.
Both identification marks provided against substitution and relevant changes
e.g. absence of one pin of a SA have to be noted in form No. 1. Noting down
also implies counting. The number of incoming SAls represents the input value
of a counting balance to be established over the ~mA fuel element storage.
After unloading and closing the shielding cask has to be sealed in such a
way, that in every case an uncontrolled opening is indicated by the broken seal.
Procedure 1-4-------------
Inspector will be informed if the transfer of a SA to cell I is intended either
by the operator or by an instrument, which records distance and load of the
underwater crane used for these transfers. In the same manner as under 1-2 the
SA's have to be identified and inspected. The data have to be noted down
in form No. 1. The number of SAls transfered represents the output value of
the counting balance over the HBA fuel element storage.
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For closing the counting balance a physical inventory 1n the storage pool
is reQuired. In the same manner as under 1-2 the SA's stored have to be
identified and inspected. The data have to be compared with t~ose in form no. 1.
The number of stored SA's represents the actual inventory value of the
counting balance over the MBA fuel element storage.
Procedure 2-1
It seems to be practicable to transfer SA's from the storage pool to cell I
only when inspection is present at the plant Le. during day. The inspector
has to observe the recorder several times a day to get information about
such events if he does not get it from the operator and can carry out M. 1-4.
Records also indicate if such events took place during night or if anything
is brought out from the containment (cell I) using the underwater channel crane.
Procedure 2-2
Because the holes in the western and eastern wall of ce11 I are not suited
for bringing out radioactive material without an increasing radiation level,
two monitors installed at the outer surface of each of these walls register
such events. In the same way another two monitors installed at the roof of
ce 11 I register the increasing radiation level if the hatch is opened. Every
transfer of radioactive material via the underwater channel is also registered
by a monitor, which is installed there. Inspector has to observe several times
a day the recorder connected with all these monitors.
The inspector has to ensure that the dissolver solution reaches the input tank
completely. For this purpose allIines in Question except the line to the input
tank and diptube lines are eQuipped with liQuid indication instruments which show
the flow direction also. The inspector has to observe the records several times
a day.
Procedure 2-4
The system given under 2-3 lS only tamperresistant if it is not changed after
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installation,e.g. by disconnection of a line equipped with a liquid indication
device and direct withdrawal of feed solution from the dissolver. Therefore
a TV camera is installed in the dissolver cavity. The receiver has to be ob-
served continuously. During absence of the inspector the picture has to be
recorded andobserved lateron.
If the door from cell I to cell 11 is opened for locking procedures, the
n-generator lS switched on automatically. The switch is sealed by the inspector.
The results of the measurements are recorded for inspection. The inspector has
to observe the records periodically. If fissile material content is higher
t~an apreset value he has to sta~t further investigation. The preset value
is based on experience.
Procedure 2-6
Several instruments provided in the inspection room are connected with the
operators system at the transmitter gallery and the central panel for independent
measurements of the incoming fissile material solution from dissolver.
Two sets of readings have to be noted down in form No. 2 •
The first set of readings on L+D+T recorder and U tubes and thermometer near
the U tubes has to be made when the L has reached i ts maximum value and the
homogenization (air sparging) is completed. The second set of reading has to be
made after the decreasing L has reached its minimum value. From the two sets
of values, the difference i.e. the amount of dissolver solution transfered to
the MBA chemical process can be calculated.
Similar measures as in 2=6 have to be carried out for the recycled acid in
the inspection room. However, U tubes and thermometers are not required.
For this purpose three tanks are provided. Besides this recycled acid, batches
containing higher amounts of fissile material have to be measured additionally
in the dissolver, particularly to avoid repeated measurement of the same bateh.
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Measures to obtain material balance information for the waste streams
can also be carried out on the inspection room. The procedure is the same
as that for the input measurement, excepting that U tubes and thermometers
are not required. A cross check of this information J.s obtained in the form of
waste solution measurement results from the waste storage tanks.
After the second set of readings of the input measurement (see 2-6), the next
batch of feed solution is transfered from dissolver to the input tank.
The inspector in a similar way as under 2-3 has to ensure that no uncontrolled
withdrawal from the accountability tank takes place.
The system given under 2-9 is only tamperresistant if it is not changed after
installation e.g. by disconnection of a line equipped with a liquid indication
instrument and direct withdrawal of feed solution from the input tank. TIlere-
fore a TV camera is installed at cell 01.
Sample taking, both for the inspector and for the operator is initiated by the
operator. The inspector has to ensure that the samples are taken from the
correct tanks and at the time indicated by the operator. This fu done by check-
lng the records of the liquid indication instruments introduced in the sampl-
ing system as explained in chapter 6.
All vials for the feed sampler are marked by the inspector. The inspector has
to deliver the vials directly before the operator intends to refill the vial
magazine of the feed sampIer. The marked vials are packed in adefinite array
in a sealed box. The inspector has to monitor by the TV system that the seal
of the box is not removed by the operator before his arrival at the feed sampIer.




The total inventory i.e. the solutions containing fissile material which
remain in the plant or inside the MBA chemical process after a campaing,
have to be measured as a temporary output. The total inventory has to be
measured simultaneously to prevent repeated measurement of the same batches.
For these measurements twelve waste eatch tanks are available.
Procedure 2-14 2-15 2-16
--------------~-----~-----
To avoid substitution of contents of vials in case of input and recycled acid,
arriving samples are stored in a casing, from which they can be locked out only
by the inspector. The arrival time of each sample inside the storage casing
r s r-ecor-ded ,
Once a day the inspector has to collect the samples using a small shielding cask.
The records of sample arrival time has to b~ compared with sampling time recor-
de d undez- 0_"Co- .........
At the same time he has to obtain the plant operators analytical results cf the
measurements in the twelve waste catch tanks, so that the information obtained
under 2-8 lS completed.
Generally form 4 has to be used tor recording the analytical results.
Inspector has to collect invento~ samples using a small shielding cask.
Procedure 2=18-------------_ ...-,.
Purely technical methods for tamper proofing the measuring installation 1n
an already existing plant are either expensive or not satisfactory. For this
reason the installation has to be inspected for changes in connection with each
measurement. For example, different items can be covered by a special paint,
so that tampering may beeome evident.
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Inspector will be informed by the pl~~t operator when bottling of Pu product
in the form of Pu nitrate solution is intended. Independent readin~on the
balance of tara and brutto weight of each bottle have to be made and noted
down by the inspector in form no. 3. An inspector sa~ple has to
be taken immediately after a bottle has been filled completely. From tara and
brutto weight and sample concentration the Pu product output value for the
material balance over the ~~ chemical process can be calculated.
The bottles have to be closed and sealed after the brutto weight determination.
The inspector seals are equipped with identification marks. Besides sealing it
has to be ensured that the bottles consideredas containment rema~n intact.
Identification marks of each bottle seal and other data have to be noted down
~n form No. 1. Noting down implies also counting of bottles to be transfered
to storage. Number of measured and sealed bottles represents the input value of
a counting balance to be established over the Pu product storage.
Seals of bottles to be shipped have to be inspected. Also each bottle as con-
tainment has to be inspected. Identification mark of each bottle seal and
other data have to be noted down in form No. 1. The number of these bottles re-
presents the output value of the counting balance over the Pu product storage.
The inspector at the receiving site has to be informed about the data on the
shipped bottles.
Seals and integrity of stored bottles have to be inspected and the identification
marks of each seal and other data to be checked in form No. 1.
Procedures 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8
--------------~----~----~----
Thenspector will be informed by the plant operator when bottling of U-product
in the form of U nitrate solution is intended.
The procedures for the measurement of uranium content in these bottles are the
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same as those for plutonium (M. 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4).
For independent measurement of waste solution to be stored permanently,
the inspector has to make readings on L.+D. recorder and to receive samples
after each transfer of high active waste under 2-8 and 2-16 respectively.
From the amount of solution and the sample concentration, the integrated amount
of fissile material contained in the storage tank can be calculated. The read-
ings have to be noted down in form No. 2.
The measuring and sampling installation of the tank for permanently stored
waste is integrated in the separate waste storage building, whi<i;h forms
apart of the strategie area 3. In connection with each measurement, the
installation has to be inspected for changes. For example different items can
be covered by a special paint, so that any tampering may beeome evident.
For independent measurement of waste solution to be stored temporarily, the
inspeetor has to make readings on L.+D. recorder of the storage tank and to
reeeive a representative sample after eaeh ttansfer from the storage tank to
the eistern truck. From the amount of solution and the sample eoncent~ation,
the amount of fissile material remaining in the tank can be ealculated. The
readings have to be noted down in form No. 2.
P1+ocedure 3-12--------------
The complete measuring end saID.pling installation of' the tanks for temporarily
stored waste is integrated in the separate waste storage building whieh forms
apart of the strategie area 3. Some measures as in 3-10 are to be carried out
here.
Procedure 3-13--------------
Immediately after filling the tank of the eistern truck is elosed and has to
be sealed. Identification marks of each tank seal and other data have to be
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not~d down ~n rorm No. 1. The receiver inspection station has to be inrormed
about this datl:li.
For independent measurement or the inventory or temporary stored waste in the
liquid waste storage, the inspector has to make readings of L.+D. and to get
representative samples from all the tanks in question. Readings have to be
noted down in rorm No. 2. From the amount of solution and the sarnple concen-
tration the fissile material inventory for closing the material balance can be
calculated.
After insertion of the solid waste barrel, the shielding container is to be
closed and sealed. Inspector seals are equipped with identification marks.
The identification marks of each container seal and other data have to be noted
down in form No. 1. The number of containers sealed, represents the input value
of a ewnting balance over the solid waste storage.
Seals of shielding containers to be shipped have to be inspected. Identification
marks of each container seal and other data have to be noted down in form No. L
The number or these conuainers represents the output value of a counting balance
over the solid waste storage.
Seals of stored shi~lding containers have to be inspected. Identification marks
of each container seal and other data have to be noted in form no. 1. The number
of th~se containers represents the inventory value of a counting balance over
the solid waste storage.
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8. Estimation of safeguards efforts
The safeguards efforts required to execute the safeguards measures indicated
in section 6 can be divided into three components:
a) Expenditures for instruments and other material
b) Expenditures for inspection personnel
c) Expenditures for analysis of sampIes.
!2_~1 The expenditures for instruments and other material expressed in cost
units are listed according to the safeguards measures in Tab. 8-1, 8-2,
8-3. The investment costs in this context are converted to annual costs
using (except in the equipment for measure 1-1) an annuity factol' of
14.2 %. This figure implies a depreciation time (= lifetime expected) of
10 years and an interest rate of 7 %.
The summed up annual costs of the different items are given ~n Tab. 8-4.
!2_22 The safeguards work was divided into two catagories: The activities to be
done mainly in the inspection room by an inspector and the activities
to be done mainly at different ether places in the plw~t by a technfcian.
The man-hours required to execute the safeguards measures are given in
Tab. 8-1, 8-2, 8-3.
The summed up man-hours given in Tab. 8-1~ show, that one inspector
together with two technicians are sufficient for a WAK type plant, if
1600 working hours/a for a safeguards personnel are assumed.
The expenditures for safeguards personnel were assumed to be
50,000 DM/a for an inspector resp.
30,000 DM/a for a technician.
~2_s2 The expected number of sampIes per year available for the inspection
and the respective analysis costs are given in Tab. 8-5.
The summed up costs for analysis in case of individual analysis of each
of the sampIes show an extremely high figure compared with the components
a) andb).
For this reason a method of reducing this cost component without decreasing
significantly the effectiveness of the safeguards concept is suggested.
An obvious approach consists in the so called composite sample technique.
Using this technique the consecutive samples of a stream i.e. one sample of
each batch in the corresponding volume proportion are poured together, homoge-
nized and only one sample out of the composed samples is analysed once or
repeatedly.
For a representative campaign over 50 operating days Fig. 8-1 and 8-2 show the
respective dependence of the relative error on the number of repeated analyses
for the product streams. The corresponding uncertainty (6) and the costs can
be obtained by the data specified.
As can be seen fröm the curves I increases only by a factor of 2 if the
number of analyses, i.e. the costs of analyses are reduced by a factor of 4.
This is indicated by dashed lines.
The summed up analysis costs, in which the above mentioned savings are included,
also are given in Tab. 8-5.
Tab. 8-6 shows the total expenditures of the safeguards concept proposed.
It should be noted that the resulting specific safeguards costs amount to about
3 %of the expected reprocessing costs for aplant like WAK having a comparative-
ly small annual throughput. A reduction seems to be possible, if the method
outlined in section 11.1.& is applied.
9. Statistical considerations in establishing a material balance
The material balance enables the inspection authority to make statements on the
possible withdrawal of fissile material in a quantitative manner.
Measurements of the throughput and the inventory of fissile material form the
basis of a material balance. Since no measurement can be carried out without
errors the material balance is also associated with an uncertainty. This
un.ertainty influences the quality of statements.
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9.1 Errors of measurement
Tne errors o~ measurements can be divided roughly into
a) random errors and
b) systematic errors
The systematic errors according to L-12_7 may be divided further into
ba) systematic errors of random origin (systematic errors of
first kind) e.g. the recalibration values of a measuring
tank,
bb) systematic errors, which can not be easily reduced to
random origin (systematic errors of second kind)
e.g. in case of a weighing procedure, if the different air
lifting power of weights and the material to be weight l is
not considered.
~2_~1 The random errors are normally known from experiments.
The relative errors I' of measurements which can be assumed for a WAK type plant
are given in Tab. 9-1.
Because " = tI/M, the standard deviation d ean be calculated, if the respeetive
amount M of fissile material per bateh is known. Values for Mfor a WAK type
plant are also given in Tab. 9-1.
The error propagation after measurement of k. batehes can be caleulated by
') J.
addition of the respective varianees d ': •
J.
In ease the amount of fissile material of a bateh is obtained by two inde-
pendent measurements, the measurement ofthe amount of solution having the
r) ~
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where e. J.S the measured eoncentration and m. the measured amount of solution
J. J.
of batch d ,
If the k batches of a stream may be assumed to be nearly equa.l, which normally is
the easet the following relation is valid.
If several independent measurements of the amount of solution and fissile
material coneentration are foreseen t the varianee after k batches is reduced
to
where t. = rel. standard deviation of a single measurement of the amount ofm
solution
n = number of independent measurements of the amount of solution perm
bateh
r = rel. standard deviation of single analysisoe
n - nwilber of independent analyses per bateh
e
For approximate ealeulation of the advantages ofthe composite sampling










where the variation of n from 1 to k implies repeated analysis of the sampIe
e
taken out of the composite sampIes of k batehes.
~2_E~1 B,y definition t a distribution ean be assumed for the systematie error
or 1. kind
2 2
where 45 = the variance of the random error (a)) t and d = the variance of ther s
systematic error of 1. kind (ba)). The error propagation after k batches ean
be ealeulated by the express~on
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For large numbers of batches the relative error of the determination of the
'total' fissile material is equal to the SUffi of the relative variances of
the systematic error.
To bb) The systematic error of 2. kind lS normally unknown. The error propa-
gation in this case tends to be linear. An approach for investigation of possibly
existing systematic errors may consist in a comparison of different measuring
installations respectively, by use of standards.
9.2 Material balance
In case Of~ different fissile material streams, the total variance for the










Tab. 9-1 shows the total variances for a material balance with and without
application öfthe composite sa~pling technique after a representative c&~paign
over 50 operating days.
9.3 Statements
On the basis of the total standard deviation ~tot a confidence interval can
be constructed.
Normally a confidence interval of 95 %is used.
In case the deficit of the material balance (MUF) lies inside this interval
i t can be stated that with a probability of 95 % 'no wi thdrawal has t aken place'.
In case the deficit of the material balance (MUF) exceeds this interval theore-
tically it can be stated that 'at least the amount of fissile material is with-
drawn by which the confidence limit is exceeded'.
Only systematic practical investigations cf the MUF will show, if such state-
ments of the inspection can be made under realistic conditions.
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10. Analysis of' the problem of' MUF
The material unaccounted f'or (r~) is considered to be generated by the
following components:
1. Propagation of systematic errors 1n the measurements used for
the material balance Le. calibration errors of tank-volume-
measurements t spike- and pipeting-errors in chemical analyses t
the influence of sample age etc.
2. Fissile material t which does not participate in fissile material
flow through the plant because of plating out at the walls and can
not be determined by physical inventory.
3. Unmeasured losses.
4. Gross errors by misreadings in the measurements.
5. Diverted material.
As already indicated 1n section 9.3,the MUF may influence the statements
about diversion to a far extent. Therefore t collection and knowledge of the
first three components of the MUF is of great importance from the safeguards
point of view.
A most promising investigation particularly in view of 2 will be started at
the WAK plant which is expected to go into operation in the near future.
11. Possibilities of improvement
In this chapter,.. a number of possible improvements with regard to safeguards
methods t instruments and techniques have been discussed and the relevant
time and costs required for these developments have been estimated. Besides t
some relevant features in a reprocessing plant t which may be of interest from
the point of view of safeguards t have also been described with the help of
a reference plant lay-out.
11.1.1.
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Photographic accounting of spent fuel subassemblies during transfer
A periscope equipped with a camera could be used to account for both the
incoming fuel-subassemblies after unloading from the shipping cask, and
those leaving the storage pool for mechanical treatment and dissolution.
The equipment 'could be installed in such a way that all the subassemblies
entering Qr leaving the storage pool, have to pass before it. A water layer
could serve as shielding.
If the fuel elements are modified as containments and equipped with tamper-
resistant identification marks at their outer surface, several photographs
from each fuel element should be taken.
B,y application of such a technique the frequency of the inspectors presence
at the fuel element storage can be reduced, which may result in a reduction
of inspection personnel.
The application of this technique at the final product storage of a reprocessing
plant could also be considered. At a later phase the information obtained could





11.1.2. Photographic accounting of stored fuel subassemblies
In principle the same technique of accounting for spent fuel elements during
transfer could be used to carry outphysical inventories in the fuel elem~nt
storage and in the final product storage area.
Normally the fuel elements are positioned on a rectanpular grid structure in
the storage pool. The pool crane could be provided with the same' unit as in
11.1.1. It has to be supplemented by a steering apparatus, which enables the
crane to reach automatically the individual fuel elements storage positions.
With such a technique inventory taking at relatively short intervals would
be possible also in the absence of an inspector. To some extent this technique






11.1.3 Containment measures for the Head-End Cell
In the WAK type plant, a discontinuity in the data on the flow of material
exists between the point the spent subassemblies leave the storage pool and
enter the head-end eell and the point after the dissolver when they lose
their identity eompletely and appear in a ehemieal solution. A distanee-eum-
load measuring instrument, attached to the underwater erane used to transfer
the spent fuel elements eoupled with radiation and liquid indieators and TV
eameras may be used to bridge this diseontinuity. The first instru~ent reristers
the movement of fissile material between the fuel element storage and the head-
end cel1. The other instruments indieate any uneontro11ed flow of high aetive
material from this area.
These instruments are standard instruments. Development work is required to
make them tamperresistant in a highly active surrounding. No esti~ate for
the time and effort for this development has been made.
11.1.4 Tamper indieating sealing teehnique
A general requirement in safeguards is a sea1ing system eapable of re1iahle,
simple and inexpensive verification in the rield L-13_7.
A proposal for sueh a system, whieh ean be used in a reproeessing plant for
shielding casks, containers for produets and wastes ete. is summarised below
and illustrated in Figs. 11.1.4-1 and 11.1.4-2.
The wire of the seal eomprises of a wire rope 1 consisting of astrand of fine
wires sheathed in a flexible thin and eorrugated tube 2. Both items are readily
available and inexpensive. The ends of the eorrugated tube eontaining the wire
rope are inserted from the side in the recesses 3 4 of the upper plug 5.After
knoting 6 the ends of the wire rope and pushing this arrangement into the
lower part of the seal body, the seal is e10sed and can not be openedwithout
leaving easily detectable marks. The lower part of the seal body comprises of a
plexiglass tube 7 a plexiglass lid 8 and a flat spr1ng 9, which are all fixed
together. The upper plug 5 is fastened by both ends 11 12 of the prestressed
spring 9 at 10.
The seal may be fingerprinted by eovering the inner surfaces of plexiglass
items 7 and 3 with a transparent varnish eontaining metal partic1es of different
shape and size. With this, replaeement of seal eomponents ean be practieally
excluded. Similar1y an undetectable repair of the wire of the seal once broken,
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can be excLude d,
Besides visual inspection of the seal components t a modified camera e.g.
polaroid camera is sufficient to identify the fingerprint.
In contrast to other sealing systems the fingerprint of the seal described
ean be found out by the plant operator. However t because of its random nature
an imitation of the fingerprint may be considered to be extremely difficult
if not impossible.
For all sealing procedures described in thisreport a sealing teehnique of the
above mentioned kind served as the basis. A price of DM lO.--/seal has been





about DM 50 tOOO.--
11.1.5 Input measurement by weighing method
Because of its higher accuraeYt the weighing system appeared to be more attractive
than the presently accepted volumetrie method used for estimating the fissile
material content in the accountability tank of a reproeessing plant. However t
investigations carried out during the year 1-14_/ t based on eleetronic force
measuring instruments t did not confirm the expected advantages.
A further possibility of the weighing method based on more conventional type





11.1.6 X-ray fluorescenee fOT analysis of dissolver and waste solutions
The X-ray fluorescenee speetroscopy appears to be a most promising method for
analysis of U and Pu concentration in high active input and waste solutions
1-1'2/ .
The method is element specific. Some of the advantages of this method are:
Independeney of the chemical state of Pu and U in solutions; relatively
low analysis costs; the method is tamperproof and easy to automatize.
The investigations are directed towards the determination of small amounts
of Pu (20-100jUg/g sOlution) in the presence of large amounts of U ~n
dissolver solutions with an accuracy sufficient for safeguards purposes.
The determination of U in solutions in the range of 0.1 - 20 mg U/g solution
with a relative standard deviation below 1 %is possible and appears to be
sufficient.
The development of the method can be considered as almost completed.
Further work refers to special cases of adaption and automatization.
11.1.7 Process inventory determination by means of isotope analysis
For large campaigns closing of the material balance for safeguards purposes
may be required before the campaign is completed. Instead of an additional
physical inventory as is normally carried out at the end of the campaign t
the process inventory determination (PID) by isotope analysis of input- and
output straams seems to be an alternative method for this purpose.
As no shut down or washout of the plant is necessary for this method t the
load factor does not decrease and the economics cf the plant is not adversely
affected. Furthermore PID does not require any unnecessary intrusion in the
plant.
The principle of this method lies ~n the fact that the fissile material process
inventoryt which is pushed out by the incoming new batches t is measured quanti-
tatively at the exit of the plant by identifying its isotopic composition. This
is possible if the concentrations of a limited number of isotopes in the inven-
tory differ sufficiently from those in the input batches which push it out
(Fig. 11.1.7-1).
A detailed description of this method is given in L-16_7.
The estimated accuracy of PID at this time is 2-10 %.
The estimated development time will be 2-3 years,with the costs in the range
of DM 400 tooo.-- . Further development work is planned to be carried out in
connection with a number of integral safeguards experiments at existing re-
processing plants.
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11.1. 8 Method of reducing input analysis efforts
As indicated in chapter 3. analysis costs for input samples contribute to
a large extent to the safeguards costs. The number of analyses can, however,
be reduced (and hence the costs) by using a special type of statistically
chosen analyses number.
The inspector obtains sampIes for all the input batches as weIl as all the
operators results of analyses for these sampIes. However, he analyses only
a randomly chosen part of these sampIes (e.g. 50-60%). He can calculate the
confidence level of the uncertainty caused by this reduction knowing the fact
that the fissile material content in input batches during a campaign can vary
within limits which can be estimated.
Study in this field is in progress and will be published in the near future.
11. 2 Layout of plants
In this chapter, a reference design of a reprocessin~ plant (Fig. 11.2-1) has
been deseribed in whieh all the requirements of controlling the fissile material
flow at strategie areas, have been incorporated without reducing the efficiency
of or being intrusive to plant operation.
The significant feature of this design is the decentralized arrangement of
separate buildings around a strategie area. The separate buildings for execution
of the main reprocessing requirements are laid out as tight containments having
only entrances and exits for fissile materials. Operational personnel can enter
or Leave the containment at other entrances or exits monitored by tamperresistant
{-locks j- 17-7.
At the strategie area the measurements, eounting and identification measures
both for the accountability of the plant operator and for safeguarding are
carried out. Therefore, some economic advantages may be expected. The auto-
matized installations are designed to indicate tampering. An operator's
laboratory for special analyses has been included in the strategie area.
The different process buildings are charaeterised by the following features:
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Chemical process building: Material balance is established by carry~ng
out throughput and inventory measurements (the latter being measured as
a temporary output) at the strategie area.
Head-end building: The process steps in the head-end building and the building
itself has been contained in such a way that only the design activities are
possible.
Waste storage building: Besides the usual balance measure limit of the fissile
material concentration for the waste is to be defined beyond which no further
safeguarding is required.
Fuel element and final product storage building: Counting and identification
of incoming and outgoing material is carried out at the strategie area using
the technique given in section 11.1.1. accounting of inventory is carried
out inside the buildings using the technique given in section 11.1.2.
A typical safeguards measure e.g. unloading of incoming spent sUbassemblies,
as fore seen ln the reference desi gn is
The seal of an arriving shielding cask arrived is automatically inspected by
means which do not require an inspector's presence. If the seal ~s intact and
the cask is ~n the correct position, thehatch of the building can be opened.
The open~ng couples the cask to the building. Similarly, the hatch can only be
closed if the lid of the container is inserted. After insertion the cask ~s
automatically locked. The ne~t opening of the lock is only possible if a signal
be given by the inspection that the cask seal ~s intact. The mechanical
procedure is shown schematica1ly ~n Fig. 11.2-2. B,y this procedure the con-
tainment of the building end the shielding cask is ensured.
Fig. 11.2-3 gives the layout of apart of the strategic area.
In c6nclusion it may be emphasised that effective safeguards measures and
procedures can be realized on1y if they are considered in close co1laboration
with the plant operator.
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establ~shment of an independent material balance
around the chemieal proeess area.
j







SP1 Fuel element storage hall
a lnspeetion room near
SP2 transmitter gallery





















Counting and Lnspectdon of arrived
shielding casks c10ntaining spent
fuel subassemblies (SA) t Lnspectdon
and removal of cask seal.
Counting t identification t and in-
spection of unloaded SAls using
glass pane and telescope.
Resealing of cask.
Purpose
To verify that BA I s could not
be removed or substituted during
transportation.
To ensure that SAls or parts of them
could not be removed or substituted
during storage.
Particularly to avoid removal of









Counting. identification t and inspec-
tion of a SA I s to be transfered to
cell I.
Counting. identification. and in-








































Recording of disitance cum Load
instrument installed at underwater
channel crane ..
Recording of rac1liation level moni-
tors installed at the outer sur-
faces of cell I.
Recording of liquid indication instru-
ments partly inc:luding flow direction
through dissolYe~r lines.
TV-observation olf dissolyer installa-
tion; camera i.nstalled inside di.ssol-
yer cavity.
Recording of siolid waste measurements
by n-generator installed in cell II.
Recording of J.evel (L) t density (D) t
and temperatuz'e (T). Additionally L
and D are indica.ted by U-tubes,
temperature of' U~tubes by thermometer.
See 2-6
(U-tubes and thermometers not
required)
Purpose
To indicate when measure 1-4
has to be carried out or in case
of absence of inspectors to record
such events, also to indicate
removal of fuel from cell I
To indicate removal of fuelf'rom
cell I.
To indicate removal of unaccounted I
dissolver solution, ~
in Yiew of measurement of recycled I
acid:
to indiaate recycling and falsification
of measurement (see 2-7).
To indicate cbanges of dissolver
installation.
To ac count fissile material in
solid ws.ste.
To establish material balance over
the MBA chemical process.
See 2-6
Tab. 6-2: Safeguards measurea at SP 2 (continued)
Receptiqn of operators anal.results. 10 be inf9r~ed about possible
lrregularltles.













































(U-tubes and thermometers not
required)
Recording of liquid indication
instruments installed at input
tank Li.nes ,
TV observatio:n of input tank,
camera installed at cell 01.
Recording of liquid installation,
instruments installed at lines
of feed sampler.
TV observation of feed sample;y;,
camera installed at sampling
gallery.
See 2-8
Reception of sampIes together with
records of arrival time
"
Inspection of installation
for L+D measurement of input and
recycled ac i d,
Purpose
To be informed about possible
irregularities.
To indicate bypassing of feed
solution resp. falsification of
measurement.
To indicate changes of input
tank installation.
To verify if the correct needle
bloc was in function and to verify I
the time an inspector sampIe was C;
I
'taken.
To monitor correet insertion of
magazine with inspector marked
vials in definite sequence;
to indicate also subsequent changes.
To establish resp. to close the
material balance over the MBA
chemical process.
To establish a material balance
over the MBA chemical process.
"
To prevent tampering of installation
for falsification of measurements.










of sampIes of Pu-product.
Purpose
To establish a material balance








Counting sealing and inspection
of Pu-bottles to be transfered
to storage.
Counting and inspection of
Pu-bottles to be shipped,
inspection o:f seals.
Counting and inspection of
stored Pu-bot.t.Les , inspection
of seals.
To ensure that Pu-product can not










ment of U product
s tz-eam
Tara-brutto 1iieighing, reception
of sampIes of U-product.
To establish a material balance
over the MBA chemical process.
Cont.ai.nmerrt 3-6 Counting, sea.Ling and inspection
of U-product containers to be
transfered tc::> storage.
To ensure that U-product can not






Waste storage Measurement of 3-9
peemanerrtLy
storl~d waste
Counting and inspection of
U-continaers to be shipped.
inspection of seals.
Counting and inspection of stored
U-cont.edner-s, inspection of aeaLs ,
L.+D. measurement , reception of




To establish a material 'balance over
the MBA chemical process resp.
to countercheck informations obtained
under 2-8 and 2-16.
Tab. 6-3: Safeguards measures at SP 3 (continued)
Place Measures No. Activities Purpose
3-10 Inspection of installation for
L.+D. meaauremerrt and sampling








L. +D. measurement , reception of
samples of temporarily stored
\faste.
Inspection of ins,tallation for
L.+D. measuremerrt and sampling
of temp10rarily stored waste.
To prevent tampering of
installations for falsifi-
cation of measurements.
To establish a material
balance over the MBA chemical
process and to countercheck 11}-
formations under 2-8 resp.2-l6








of the 'tank of the eistern truck.
See 3-11
To ensure that waste solution can
not be removed 01' substituted
during transportation.
I
To establish resp. to close,the ~
material balance over the MBA I
chemical process.
To ensure that solid waste can
not be removed, 01' substituted
during storage.
Counting,sealing, and inspection
of shie1ding containers, into
which soLi.d waste barrels have
been inserted.
3-16 Countin,g and inspection of shield- See 3-15
ing containers to be shipped,
inspection of seals.
3-15ContainmentCell OIl








Date Contents Comments Photographs of seal fing erprintNo Containment Marks
MBA MBA
r _.- -- - --. -- -- -- -, r - - - - - - -l /--,
0 B 1.10.69
I 11 11 '\
No.2- 4 Example I 11 11 I
Shielding Transnuclear I I I I \ I
1
L_. _____ ....JL _.J -, .... _~/
cask XYZ 2345 r - - - - -- -.., r---- - ----, /--,
B 0 2.10.69 empty
I 11 11 \
- I I I I \ I
I I I I\./






B H 1.11.69 11 - - ,
3
4








Oebefore.Jecf ter transfer 0,.,








in tank No. ::J-Ul.'
Month








Form No, Last measu re- ./1).0
:3
Page No.
ment in the '-:!1>same tank (Q
Line :i>
Solution [0 C] :-n·c
temperature .........
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Type of material 1 ) z0





Tab. 8-1: Safeguards efforts l~ SPl
+) normal case: annUlity factor (lifetime 10 years) =14.2 %)
++) special case:annUlity factor (lifetime 5 years) = 24.5 %
Instruments Number of Estimated Total costs Annual charges+) No.of Estimated Total time required
Measures required Instruments unit costs attivities time re- for for
per year quired per inspector technician
unit activity
L-DM_7 L-DM_7 [DM/a_7 L-h_7 L-h/a_1 L-h/a_7




40 0.5 - 20
Photographie 4 .++)
equipment 1 1000 1000 2 5
I




1-3 See 1-1 ISeals ~~O 10 400 400 40 0.5 - 20
1-4 - - - - - 400 0.25 - 100
1-5 - - - - - 4 2 - 8
I iSUbtotadl.~ 652 DM/a Subtotal 228 h/aI -





mal charges No.of Estimated Total time reaui~en
activities time re- for for
per year quired per inspector technician
unit activ.
LDM/a_7 I-h_/ r--: tv-:
710 200 0.05 10 -
2.000 200 0.1 20 -
1111-




2.800 200 0.1 20 -
570
430
210 40 0.05 2 -




Instruments rwnber of' Estirnated Total costs








+installation 1 5.000 5.000
Radiation level
2-2 monitor+recorder
+installation 7 2.000 14.000
Liquid indication
instrument+installa-




installation 3 350 1.050
Electric equipment 1 2.000 2.000
Recorder 1 2.000 2.000




installation I 1 4.000 4.000!
Recorder I 1 3.000 3.000
I




Tab. 8-2: Safeguards efforts at SP2 (continued)
L-h/a_7L-h/a_1
400.2
Estimated Total time required
time re- for I for








































































































Subtotal: 12.304 DM/a Subtota1: ,130 h/a
===========d=========
Tab. 8-2: Sa.feguards efforts at SP2 (cont i.nued)










Estimated Total time required
time re- for I for
quired per inspector technician
unit activit~



























































































ua1 charges No.of Estimated Total time required
activities time re- for for
per year quired per inspector technician
unit activity
-DM/a_7 L-CL7 L-h/a_7 L-h/a_7
- 400 0.25 - 100
- 400 0.25 - 100
4.000
I
- 40 0.5 - 20
- 4 0.5 - 2
- 836 0.25 - 209
- 836 0.25 - 209
8.360
====~~~=~~:J12.360 DM/a Subtotal::========== ==========
L.
==
AnnInstruments Number of Estimated Total costs




3-1 - - - -
see 1-1 - - -3-2
Seals 400 10 4.;000
3-3 see 1-1 - - -
3-4 see 1-1 - - -
3-5 - - - -
3-6 see 1-1 - - -
Seals 836 10 8.360
Subtotal:
. ========1:=
Tab. 8-3: Safeguards efforts at SP3 (continued)
Instruments Numbez of Estimated Total costs Annual charges No.of Estimated Total time required
Measures required instruments unit costs activities time re- for for
per year quired per inspector technician
unit activity
L-DM_I L-DM_7 L-DM/~7 L-h_7 L-h/a_1 L-h/a_1
3-7 See 1-1 - - - - 136 0.5 - 68
3-8 See 1-1 - - - - 4 0.5 - 2
(shielding cask
ror samp'Iea) - - - - 40 0.25 - 10
3-9
see 2-14,2-15
3-10 I 40 0.25 - 10- - - - -
(shielding cask
for sampIes) - - - - 15 0.25 - 4
3-11
see 2-14,2-] 5
3-12 - - - - - 15 0.25 - 4










............_ .................__ii ......iiiii ==
Instl1uments Numbez of Estimated Total costs Annua1 charges No.of Estimated Total time required
Measures required instruments unit costs activities time re- for for
per year quired per inspector technician
unit activity
L-DM_I L-DM_I LDM/a_1 L-h_1 L-h/a_1 L-h/a_/
See 1-1 15 0.25 - 43-13
seals 15 10 150 150
I
I





3-15 200 0.25 - 50seals :200 10 2.000 2.000
3-16 - - - - - 40 0.5 - 20
3-17 4 0.5 - 2- - - - -
ISubtota1: 2.150 DM/a Subtotal:· 80 h/a
-~~--- -' ~~~---- i========J====~=====
Tab. 8-4: Summed up e~eenditures for instruments and sa~guards personnel
Strategie Table Co:sts for instruments and Inspecto.!:, Technicianpoint other material L-DM/a_1 L-Man-hours/a_/ L-Man-hours/a_1
subtotal subtotal subtotal
0
1 8-1 652 - 228
652 '" 228
.
2 8-2 7.543 72 -
2 8-2ctd. 12.304 130 -
2 8-2ctd. 3.890 41 192
23.737 243 192
3 8-3 12.360 - 640
3 8-3etd. - - 98
3 8-3ctd. 2.150 - 80
14.510 - 818
Annua1 eapital eharges Total: 38.247 DM/a lTotal: 243 Mh/a+) Total: 1.238 Mh/a
No. of safeguards personne1:
++)
1 Inspeetor=50.000 DM/a I 2 Teehnieian=60.000 DM/a
+)Working time for evaluation of data obtained not inc1uded.
++)To guarantee suffieient free time during campaigns and for the ease of illness 2 technicians were assmned.





Tab. 8-5: Expenditures fQ]:" individual analysis of each inspec:tor sample
Assumpt ion : In case Lnspector samples are not analysed at the laboratory of the plant operator
they have to be transported to a neutral laboratory e.g. from the WAK plant to the
EURATOM institute for transuranium elements. Distance about 1 km.





No.of Analysis Estimated unit costs Annual costs for individual Annual costs for analysi
Stream inspec:tor method of the analysis_method analysis of each inspector composite sampling
aamp.Lea Za applied L DM/ analys is_/ sam.E.l e technique app~ied fQr
L DM/a_1 c and e L DM/a_/ .
,




b Recycled acid 80 U:Photometry
40
5.200 5.200Pu:O(-count. 25
c U235>lt6% 1600 64.000 12.800
U-product Coulometry 40
d U235<lt6% 72 2.880 2.880
e Pu-product 800 Coulometry 40 32.000 8.00(;)'
..
f Waste 16 U:Photometry
40 1.040 1.040Pu:O(-count. 25
.
• 4019 Perm.stored waste 40 " 2.600 2.60025
,,_.......,.........,
h Temp.stored waste 35 "
40
2.275 2.27525
Total 349.995 DM/a 274.795 DM/a-
Tab. 8-6: Total annual charges and specific costs for safeguards
measures.
1. Annual capital charges 38 247 DM/a
2. Personnel llO 000 "
3. Other operation costs
analysis charges 274 795 "
transport of samples 6 000 "
maintenance, utilities (2 %of 1) 764 11
4. Ivliscellaneous (io %of 1.2.3) 42 980 "
Total annual charges (sum 1./.4)) 472 786 DM/a
====================================================================
Total throughput of the WAK plant
Specific costs for safeguards measures
40 000 kg U0
2
/ a




Tab. 9-1 Approximate Reference Cornpulqn 10t U0 2 / 50 operating duys'
Stream Tank No. Batch Rel.error u-ccncen- Ret.error Pu-concen Ret.error U/batch Pu I No.of UI Pul Ret.error of integrated amount of Standard deviation of integratedamount of
size of vol. tralion of trntlon of Mu [kg] bntch batches/ campaign cnmpoiqn U S totu [o/~] I Pu 0totpu. [o/oJ UGtot U [kg] I Pu GtotPu. [g]
determ. resp. [g/l] analysis [g/IJ analysis Mpu.[gJ campaign [kg] [g] composite sampling technique composite sampling technique
[I] weigh. .5)0/0] liel.< [010) bc p... [0/0] not not not not
applied applied applied applied applied applied applied applied
Feed 37,08 800 1.0 227'~ ) 0.8 1,3 +) 0.7 181.5 1040 150 9075 52000 0.16 - 0.16 - lL,.50 - 83.3 -
2WW 37.02 125 2JJ 2.14 3.0 0.007 50 0.267 0.87 20 5.35 17.5 0.81 - 11.2 - ON - 0.19 -
AFA L,8.05 500 2.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
AFA 48.10 500 2.0 - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - -
U-Product
< 1.6 0/0
U-235 SAFRAP 2500 0.1 440,f) 0.1 . - 1100 - 8 9900 - 0.04 - - - 3.96 - - -
Il-Product
1.6-3 0/0
U-235 Bettle 110 01 440~') 0.1 - - 48.4 - 200 9680 - 0.009 0.016 - - 0.87 1.55 - -
Pu-Product BoUte 10 0.01 - - 50+ ) 0.1 - 500 100 - 50000 - - 0.007 0.02 - - 3.50 10.0
1 HLW 81.21 250 3.0 0.29 5.0 6'10 -4 50 0.073 0.15 ,10 0.73 1.5 - - - - - - - -
8211
Different ,12
waste .13 > 3.0 3,0 50 -4 - 90 - 500 2.12 - 25 - 1.9 - 125 -
streams .14
.15
+) 2 analyses I batch i f composite sampling technique is not applied •
Pu
Standard deviation after campaign; U (1,6-30/0U 23~i )
U «1.6 0/0) ,
composite sampling technique
not ap-Rlied ap"p~
{itot"L = 150 9 5t • h t = 15'[ s .;
~.-.!i'O'Q( = lL,.6 kg .§.totat = 14,7 kg_
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SP 1 SP 2 M 8 A= Material balance area
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Waste Storqge
® ®
From oll tanks inside borderline instruments for liquid volume
determination are installed at inspection room (SP2a )
Fig.6-1: Tanks, frorn which intor rnution is obtained in 5 P 2
I
u>1.6 %U235
Rel.error of weight meas. Jw 0.1 %
Rel.error of analysis /,C 0.1 %
Values Number of' batches k 200
assumed:
Number of weight meas , n 1per batch w
Number of analyses n
per sample c 1
Rel.error after k batches cfone sample analysed 0.1 %
Results:
Repeated analyses d =J/Yl~ 200'
of the same sample a see curve
200 batches:M:9680 kg















Fig. 3-1: U-product stream: dependence of rel. error on number of analyses
Pu
Re1.error of weight meas. lw
0.01 %
Re1.error of analysis Je 0.1 %
Va1ues
assumed: Number of batehes k 100
Number of weight meas , n 1per bateh w.
Number of ana1yses
per s ampLe n 1e
Rel. error after k batches Jone sample analysed 0.1 %
Resu1ts:
Repeated ana1yses ~a=Jli 1~10o'
see curve
of the same sampIe:
S= 5/M
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No of
analysis




































STRATEGie AREA FOR EXECUTION
~ OFALL ACCOUNTABILlTV.SAFEGUARDSWORK
OFALL ANA.LY T1C LABORATORY WORK FI~.11.2"1 SCHEME OF A FUTURE REPROCESSING PLANT







Fig.l1.2-2 Scheme of the mechanic part of the
shipping container coupling at the unloading
hatch of the storage building
Buitding for mechanical treatment
and dissolution
Waste storage buitding







Input accounta bility tank Monitor tor solid waste







inner surfaces covered by
transparent varnish containing
pa.rticles =fingerprint
Fig.11.1.4-1 Construction of a
tamperindicating seal 8
plexiglass lid
F i 9·11.1.4-2 Example of application of the
seal on a shielding cask for
spent fuel elements
Detail /I A /I
.~·\/IA/l
~ )->===~~~777777775Y:z/ 7 ~1---' b7777 /I I ~ r "










Fig.l1.1.8-1 Principle of Process Inventory Determination

